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Abstract
In this paper we show that the main empirical ﬁndings about ﬁrm diversiﬁcation
and performance are consistent with the maximization of shareholder value. In our
model, diversiﬁcation allows a ﬁrm to explore better productive opportunities while
taking advantage of synergies. By explicitly linking the diversiﬁcation strategies of the
ﬁrm to diﬀerences in size and productivity, our model provides a natural laboratory
to investigate quantitatively several aspects of the relationship between diversiﬁcation
and performance. Speciﬁcally, we show that our model is able to rationalize both the
evidence on the diversiﬁcation discount (Lang and Stulz (1994)) and the documented
relation between diversiﬁcation and ﬁrm productivity (Schoar (2002)).
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Introduction

Empirical work on ﬁrm diversiﬁcation has often been interpreted as supporting the view
that conglomerates are ineﬃcient. Findings such as the fact that conglomerates trade at
a discount, relative to a portfolio of comparable stand-alone ﬁrms, have led researchers to
believe that diversiﬁcation destroys value.1 Popular explanations for this “diversiﬁcation
discount” have generally emphasized the agency and behavioral problems associated with
the existence of conglomerates.2 Unfortunately, this view of diversiﬁcation creates at least
two diﬃculties for researchers.

First, while addressing the eﬀects of diversiﬁcation on

performance, agency models often fail to answer the more fundamental economic question
of why diversiﬁed ﬁrms exist at all, as diversiﬁcation is often ex-ante ineﬃcient. Second, the
empirical predictions of these agency-based models are usually very hard to quantify and
thus quite diﬃcult to test. As a consequence, direct evidence supporting this agency view
is quite limited. Instead, support typically comes from the perceived failures of competing
theories.
In this paper we show that the main empirical regularities about ﬁrm diversiﬁcation
are broadly consistent with the neoclassical view of eﬃcient ﬁrm diversiﬁcation. In our
model, ﬁrms diversify for two reasons. First, diversiﬁcation allows ﬁrms to take advantage
of economies of scope by eliminating redundancies across diﬀerent activities and lowering
ﬁxed costs of production. Second, diversiﬁcation allows a mature, slow growing, ﬁrm to
explore attractive new productive opportunities. We formalize this concept by assuming that
production activities exhibit decreasing returns to scale. As scale grows, returns decrease,
eventually leading the ﬁrm to search for proﬁt opportunities in new activities.
In contrast to standard agency arguments, the structure of our model provides a natural
environment to investigate quantitatively the role of ﬁrm diversiﬁcation on performance.
Since the model generates an artiﬁcial cross-sectional distribution of ﬁrms, we are able to
directly compare our results with the available empirical evidence.
1

See Wernerfelt and Montgomery (1988), Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), Rajan, Servaes,
and Zingales (2000), Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2001), Whited (2001), Lamont and Polk (2001, 2002),
and Campa and Kedia (2002) among others.
2
See Jensen (1986), Amihud and Levy (1981), Jensen and Murphy (1990), Shleifer and Vishny (1989),
and Stulz (1990), Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997), and Scharfestein and Stein (2000) among others.
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We have two main sets of ﬁndings. First, the model predicts that diversiﬁed ﬁrms have,
on average, a lower value of Tobin’s Q than focused ﬁrms, as documented by Lang and
Stulz (1994). This happens despite the fact that diversiﬁcation is optimal and there is no
source of ineﬃciency in our model. The intuition, however, is simple. In our model, ﬁrms
diversify only when they become relatively unproductive in their current activities. It is this
endogenous selection mechanism that accounts for the lower valuation of diversiﬁed ﬁrms.
Second, because our model explicitly links productivity with corporate diversiﬁcation, we can
also address recent evidence on the eﬀects of diversiﬁcation on productivity (Schoar (2002)).
We ﬁnd that, just as in the data, our model predicts that ﬁrms following diversiﬁcation
strategies also experience empirically plausible productivity losses.
This emphasis on the importance of ﬁrm selection in accounting for the performance of
conglomerates eﬀectively presents a theoretical foundation for the recent empirical ﬁndings
by Chevalier (2001), Villalonga (2001), Graham, Lemmon and Wolf (2002), and Campa and
Kedia (2002). Although their exact sources and methodologies diﬀer, all of these papers are
part of a growing empirical literature suggesting that sample selection accounts for most, if
not all, of the ex-post diﬀerences between conglomerates and specialized ﬁrms.
More broadly, our work is also part of a recent strand of literature that emphasizes
a neoclassical view of optimal resource allocation in determining the observed pattern of
diversiﬁcation.

For example, Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) show that the allocation

of resources within conglomerates is related to productivity in the diﬀerent segments.
Matsusaka (2001) models diversiﬁcation as an intermediate, and less productive, stage in
a search process over industries that best match the ﬁrm’s organizational capabilities. When
the perfect match is found, a ﬁrm eventually specializes. Finally, Bernardo and Chowdhry
(2002) explain the diversiﬁcation discount by assuming that specialized ﬁrms have growth
options allowing them to diversify in the future. Because conglomerates are ﬁrms who have
exercised these options they are less valuable to investors.
While our dynamic environment incorporates features from each of these models, our
analysis diﬀers in two crucial ways. First, while these papers are focused on a single issue, our
approach provides a uniﬁed and consistent explanation for much of the empirical evidence by
endogenously linking productivity, size, and valuations to diversiﬁcation strategies. Second,
2

instead of assuming that diversiﬁcation is ex-ante less valuable, our model is able to
endogenously generate a diversiﬁcation discount, an explanation that seems consistent with
recent empirical evidence.
Finally, our work also oﬀers a useful framework to study the natural boundaries of the
ﬁrm in the context of a neoclassical environment. While our model is silent about the exact
micro-foundations for the interactions between (and within) ﬁrms (for example, internal
capital markets, incomplete contracts, and power relationships within contracts), it provides
something of a reduced form approach that is well suited for detailed empirical study, a
serious diﬃculty in this ﬁeld of research.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the basic economic
environment and discusses our main assumptions.

Section 3 provides a quantitative

evaluation of our model and establishes its main empirical implications. Section 4 concludes.

2

Model

The economy consists of 2 sectors: households and ﬁrms. The core of the analysis is
our description of the production sector, where a large number of ﬁrms is engaged in the
production of the consumption good. The role of households is limited and summarized by
a single representative household making optimal consumption and portfolio decisions.

2.1

Firms

The production side of the economy consists of a large number of ﬁrms and two separate
industries or sectors. While the model can be augmented to include more sectors, this would
make the analysis unnecessarily complicated. Empirically, the eﬀects of diversiﬁcation on
performance are most notable when ﬁrms ﬁrst expand from one to two segments, with
additional expansions having only marginal eﬀects on performance (Lang and Stulz (1994)).
2.1.1

Description

We assume that time is discrete and the horizon is inﬁnite. In each time period t, a ﬁrm
can either be focused in sector st = 1, 2 or operate in both sectors simultaneously, in which
case we will say that a ﬁrm is diversiﬁed and set st = 1 + 2 = 3. We assume that sectoral
3

mobility is costly so that specialized ﬁrms cannot simply move all resources from sector 1 to
sector 2 (say). Formally, we assume that:

{st−1 , 3}, st−1 = 1, 2
st ∈
{1, 2, 3}, st−1 = 3

(1)

In other words, a ﬁrm that has previously been focused in sector s can only choose to remain
in sector s (st = st−1 ), or to expand to both sectors (st = 3). Diversiﬁed ﬁrms, however,
face no restrictions: they can either remain diversiﬁed, or they can contract and focus on
just one industry. This costly mobility ensures that a ﬁrm must diversify before focusing on
entirely new activities, a pattern that is consistent with the data.3
The outcome of production in sector s, during period t, is the ﬁnal good yts . For simplicity,
we assume that the goods are perfect substitutes so that the relative price between yt1 and yt2
is always equal to 1. Production in either sector requires two inputs: capital or productive
capacity, kt , and labor, lt , and is subject to a technology shock zts . Labor is hired at the
competitive wage rate Wt > 0, but capacity is owned by the ﬁrm. Production possibilities
for an individual ﬁrm operating in sector s are described by a Cobb-Douglas production
function:
s

yts = ezt ktαk ltαl ,

0 < αk + αl < 1,

(2)

where αk and αl are the output elasticities of capital and labor, respectively. The restrictions
on these coeﬃcients guarantee that production in each sector exhibits decreasing returns to
scale, so that returns fall as the ﬁrm grows.
Productivity levels are ﬁrm speciﬁc and cannot be traded. We assume that productivity
in each sector s follows a simple AR(1) process
s
+ εst ,
zts = ρzt−1

(3)

where each εst is a normal random variables with mean zero and variance σ 2 . For simplicity
we also assume that there is no cross-correlation between the shocks in the two sectors. To
save on notation we also deﬁne the productivity vector zt = (zt1 , zt2 ).
Finally, total ﬁrm capacity is described by the law-of-motion
kt+1 = (1 − δ)kt + it ,
3

(4)

This assumption seems plausible but it is not crucial. It will, however, make it easier to construct Figure
2 below and to gain some intuition about our results.
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where it denotes gross investment spending, and δ is the depreciation rate of capital. Thus,
new investment, it , becomes productive only at the beginning of the next period.
The timing of the decisions is illustrated in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Timing of Events

zt is revealed
t

t+1

?

-

6

6

Firm arrives with
(st−1 , kt , zt−1 )

Firm chooses
st and kt+1

Every ﬁrm arrives at period t with a pre-chosen level of capacity kt . Before any activity
takes place the ﬁrm observes the (ﬁrm-speciﬁc) vector of productivity levels in both sectors,
zt . With this information at hand, each ﬁrm makes the following choices during the period
t:
• the optimal sectoral decision for the current period, st , by choosing whether to operate
one (st = 1 or 2) or both (st = 3) production units in period t;
• the optimal allocation of capital and labor across its activities;
• how much to invest for the future, it , and, as a consequence, the total amount of
capacity to install at the beginning of the next period, kt+1 .
A ﬁrm that chooses to focus its activities in sector st alone generates the following proﬁts
during period t:
 s

π(st , kt , zt ; Wt ) = max ezt ktαk ltαl − Wt lt − f ,
lt

st = 1, 2

(5)

where f ≥ 0 is a ﬁxed cost of production that must be paid if the ﬁrm is active in sector s.4
4

Fixed costs guarantee a minimum scale of production, thus forcing a ﬁrm to stay focused, unless outside
opportunities are suﬃciently attractive. As we show below, without ﬁxed costs a ﬁrm will always be
diversiﬁed.

5

Conversely, if the ﬁrm chooses to be diversiﬁed (so that st = 3), proﬁts are described by:
 1
2
π(3, kt , zt ; Wt ) = max ezt (θt kt )αk (θt lt )αl + ezt ((1 − θt )kt )αk ((1 − θt )lt )αl
lt ,θ t

(6)

−Wt lt − (2 − λ)f } ,
s.t.

0 ≤ θt ≤ 1,

where θt denotes the fraction of resources (capital and labor) that the diversiﬁed ﬁrm
allocates to sector 1 in period t.5 Because diversiﬁed ﬁrms operate in both sectors, they
face larger ﬁxed costs of production. However, equation (6) embeds our assumption that
they can eliminate redundancies and thus save a fraction λ/2 of the combined costs. Thus,
a conglomerate pays only ﬁxed costs in the amount (2 − λ)f.
The solution to these static optimization problems yields optimal decision rules for total
ﬁrm employment, lt = l(st , kt , zt ; Wt ), the size of each segment, θt = θ(st , kt , zt ; Wt ), as well
as total production, yt = y(st , kt , zt ; Wt ).
2.1.2

Discussion

Our environment is constructed to incorporate the basic incentives for the creation of
conglomerates identiﬁed by the literature on ﬁrm diversiﬁcation. Somewhat loosely our
model emphasizes some of the most popular advantages of ﬁrm diversiﬁcation: “synergies”
and the exploration of “free” cash ﬂows. Synergies are created through the elimination of
redundancies across business lines, such as overhead. In our model, this feature is captured
by the savings parameter λ. Such dilution of costs generates a form of economies of scope and
creates an incentive for diversiﬁcation. Decreasing returns to scale in each activity generate
something like a “free cash ﬂow” eﬀect: as the ﬁrm grows in size, marginal productivities fall
and it becomes unproﬁtable for the ﬁrm to invest additional resources in on-going activities.
Instead, the ﬁrm can better use resources by exploring new production possibilities. Thus,
diversiﬁcation is more likely to be optimal for large ﬁrms, since it enables them to overcome
the decreasing returns nature of the single sector technology. This feature is also consistent
with the empirical observation that large ﬁrms are much more likely to become diversiﬁed.
5

Since wages and prices do not diﬀer across sectors, capital-labor ratios must also be identical. It follows
that the conglomerate must allocate the same share of capital and labor inputs to each sector.
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In addition to these core advantages, conglomerates also beneﬁt from two additional
features of our environment. They have more options than stand-alone ﬁrms (the mobility
restriction (1)). Although this is not a crucial feature of our model, it stands in contrast to
Bernardo and Chowdry (2002), who rationalize the diversiﬁcation discount by assuming that
focused ﬁrms have more options than conglomerates. Finally, since the productivity shocks
zt1 and zt2 are not perfectly correlated (as in equation (3) above), ﬁrm diversiﬁcation also
lowers cash ﬂow risk. In the absence of trading frictions, however, this risk pooling can be
easily replicated by a portfolio of stand-alone ﬁrms and therefore is not valued by investors.
Synergies and overcoming decreasing returns, however, generate value to shareholders.
In each of these cases production is more eﬃcient and resources are saved, when operations
are combined in a conglomerate. Hence, unlike much of the literature, our model captures
some of the most plausible beneﬁts to corporate diversiﬁcation while abstracting from any
of its potential drawbacks, such as those induced by agency or behavioral problems.
We believe that emphasizing these advantages of the conglomerates is important because
it ensures that a model does not deliver a diversiﬁcation discount “by assumption”. Since
conglomerates have generally more resources and better opportunities in our model, their
low valuation can only be the endogenous outcome of self-selection and not the obvious
consequence of assuming that focused ﬁrms are, a priori, better. As a number of recent
studies suggest, this explanation seems to consistent with the available evidence.
2.1.3

Optimality

Let (s, k, z) denote the state for a ﬁrm that was active in sector s in period t − 1, has k units
of installed capacity at the beginning of period t, and faces a vector of productivity shocks
z. The optimal behavior of this ﬁrm can be summarized by the value function v(s, k, z; W ),
that solves the dynamic programming problem:






 


v(s, k, z; W ) = max
π(s , k, z; W ) + (1 − δ)k − k + β v(s , k , z ; W )N (dz |z)
 
k ,s

(7)

subject to equation (1).6 Here 0 < β < 1 is the intertemporal discount factor and N (dz  |z)
is the cumulative (Gaussian) distribution of z  , conditional on z. Note that current cash
6

We use the convention s , k  , z  , etc. to denote the value of the state variables that are relevant at the
beginning of the next period.
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ﬂows (dividends) are given by current proﬁts, π(·), net of investment spending, i, which is
described by (4). Proposition 1 establishes the existence of a unique function v(s, k, z), that
satisﬁes (7), and lists some of its basic properties.
Proposition 1 There exists a unique function v(s, k, z) that solves the dynamic program
(7). Moreover, this function is (i) continuous; and (ii) increasing in both k and z.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Note that the value function is always increasing in the vector of shocks z = (z 1 , z 2 ). In
other words, the value of the ﬁrm increases in each shock, regardless of whether the ﬁrm was
operating in that sector or not. Finally, the solution to the dynamic programming problem
(7) also produces a set of policy functions, k(s, k, z; W ) and s(s, k, z; W ), associated with the
optimal accumulation of capital and the sectoral choices of the ﬁrm. It is straightforward to
show that all these functions are well deﬁned.
2.1.4

The Decision to Diversify

Before exploring the quantitative implications of the model, it is useful to study some of
the inner workings of our model, to try to gain some intuition about our numerical results
below. Accordingly, this section attempts to shed some light on the optimal diversiﬁcation
decision of an individual ﬁrm.
The optimal industrial decision, s = s(s, k, z), can be computed as follows. First, deﬁne
the function
 


 


β v(s , k , z )N (dz |z) − k
p(s , k, z) ≡ π(s , k, z) + (1 − δ)k + max





k

(8)

as the value of the ﬁrm, conditional on having adopted sectoral decision s in the current
period. Since focused ﬁrms are not allowed to simply switch sectors, a ﬁrm that was
previously specialized in sector s ∈ {1, 2}, ﬁnds corporate diversiﬁcation optimal if, and
only if:7
p(3, k, z) ≥ p(s , k, z) |s =s = p(s, k, z)
7

Similarly, a ﬁrm that was diversiﬁed in the previous period (s = 3) will choose to remain diversiﬁed if
p(3, k, z) ≥ max {p(1, k, z), p(2, k, z)} .

8

However, it is probably more useful to represent this decision on the space of state
variables. Proposition 2 shows how this can be done, by deﬁning something analogous to an
“indiﬀerence curve”, or, perhaps more appropriately, a “diversiﬁcation threshold”, separating
the decisions to diversify or not into diﬀerent regions of the state space.8 Proposition 2 also
establishes the key properties of this threshold.
Proposition 2 The optimal diversiﬁcation decision can be characterized by the unique
threshold value:
k̂(s, z) = arg min {s(s, k, z) = 3} ,
k

∀(s, z) ∈ S × Z

(9)

Moreover, k̂(s, z), is: (i) increasing in z s and, (ii) decreasing in z s, s = s.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Figure 2 illustrates these results by showing the shape of the optimal sectoral decision
for a ﬁrm previously focused in sector 1, s(1, k, z). The Figure depicts the diversiﬁcation
threshold, holding the level of z 2 ﬁxed. Remember that this ﬁrm can only choose to remain
in sector 1, or to diversify. By deﬁnition, points along this line correspond to combinations of
productivity, z, and size, k, for which the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between focusing and diversifying.
The positive slope of k̂(1, z), implies that, given size, ﬁrms are more likely to remain
focused when productivity is high in the incumbent sector, z 1 , while diversiﬁcation becomes
optimal when this productivity becomes too low. Similarly, holding productivity constant,
diversiﬁcation is more likely for large ﬁrms, a consequence of decreasing returns to scale.
It is this endogenous selection feature of our model that drives several of our quantitative
results below and, in particular, our ﬁndings of a diversiﬁcation discount in the cross-section
of ﬁrms. Thus, the model formalizes the argument proposed in several empirical studies (see
Chevalier (1999), Villalonga (2001), Graham, Lemmon and Wolf (2002), and Campa and
Kedia (2002)), that conglomerates are not simply a random subsample of the cross-sectional
distribution of ﬁrms. Instead, because the decision to diversify is endogenous, it is associated
with ex-ante diﬀerences in ﬁrm-speciﬁc features such as productivity and size. These ex-ante
features account for the ﬁndings about ex-post performance and valuation of conglomerates.
8

Formally, this threshold is a separating hyperplane in the 4-dimensional space of state variables.
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Figure 2: The Diversification Threshold
This Figure illustrates the shape of the optimal sectoral decision, s(1, k, z), for a ﬁrm that was previously
focused in sector 1. The horizontal axis shows capacity, k, and the vertical axis shows the level of productivity
in on-going activities, z 1 . Since the ﬁrm was previously focused in sector 1, it has only two choices: it can
either remain in sector 1 in the current period, or it can diversify and operate in both sectors simultaneously.
The Figure shows the contour line of the optimal sectoral decision, holding the level of productivity in the
other sector, z 2 , ﬁxed. Points along this line correspond to combinations of productivity, z , and size, k , for
which the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between focusing and diversifying.

k

6

k̂(1, z)

diversify

focus

-

0

z
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Corollaries 3 and 4 establish two additional properties of the optimal industrial strategy
s(s, k, z). Corollary 3 shows why the role of ﬁxed costs is crucial in our analysis. Without
them, proﬁts are always positive in both sectors and the ﬁrm would have no incentive to
focus, given the assumption of decreasing returns to scale. Corollary 4 shows that if synergies
are suﬃciently large there is never an incentive for the ﬁrm to be focused.
Corollary 3 In the absence of ﬁxed costs (f = 0), diversiﬁcation is always optimal.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Corollary 4 Suppose f > 0. Diversiﬁcation is the optimal corporate strategy if λ ≥ 1, i.e.
synergies are suﬃciently large.
Proof. See Appendix A.

2.2

Aggregation and Equilibrium

To provide a detailed evaluation of the implications of our model, we need to construct an
artiﬁcial panel of ﬁrms that can then be used to examine the available empirical evidence.
We can do this by aggregating the individual decisions of every ﬁrm in the economy and
computing the equilibrium in our model. Since each ﬁrm can be described by the (s, k, z),
the cross-sectional distribution of ﬁrms is completely summarized by a measure, µ(s, k, z),
deﬁned over this state space. The law of motion for µ is given by:








µ (s , k , z ) =



1{k =k(s,k,z;W )} × 1{s =s(s,k,z;W )} N (z  |dz)µ(ds, dk, z),

(10)

where 1{.} is an indicator function that equals 1 if the argument is satisﬁed and 0
otherwise. Intuitively, next period’s cross-sectional distribution of ﬁrms is determined by
combining the exogenous transition probabilities implied by N (·) with the endogenous ones,
prescribed by the optimal policies for capacity, k(s, k, z), and sectoral choices, s(s, k, z). For
empirical purposes we are interested in the properties of a stationary equilibrium where this
distribution does not depend on initial conditions, so that µ = µ.
To close the model, we must oﬀer a description of market demand for the ﬁnal goods
produced, as well as the supply of labor input. While it is easy to provide reduced form
11

expression for these functions, it is also straightforward to show how this can be done in
general equilibrium by adding a very stylized description of household/shareholder behavior.
Speciﬁcally, we summarize the household sector with a single representative agent deriving
utility from leisure, L, and consumption, C, and income from wages, W , and dividends,
D. Without aggregate uncertainty, all aggregate quantities and prices are constant and the
consumer problem collapses to the static representation:
max U = ln(C − AL)
C,L

s.t.

(11)

C = W L + D.

The optimality conditions for this problem yield a demand for ﬁnal goods given by
C = C(µ; W, D) and an inﬁnitely elastic labor supply which pins down the wage rate at
W = A.9
A stationary equilibrium for this economy is characterized by the following deﬁnition.
Definition 5 (Stationary Equilibrium) A stationary competitive equilibrium is: (i) a
set of optimal polices k(·), l(·), π(·) and s(·) and a value function v(·) for each ﬁrm; (ii) an
optimal allocation rule C(µ; W ) for the representative household; (iii) a wage rate W and
(iv) a stationary measure µ of ﬁrms such that:

C(µ; A) = A l(s, k, z; W )µ(ds, dk, dz) + D(µ; A)

(12)

Equation (12) also summarizes labor market equilibrium, by imposing W = A. It also
uses the fact that aggregate dividends are given by10


D(µ; A) = π(s, k, z; A)µ(ds, dk, dz) − (k(s, k, z; A) − (1 − δ)k) µ(ds, dk, dz).

(13)

Given our assumptions, establishing the existence of a stationary competitive equilibrium
is immediate.11 Although the deﬁnition seems abstract and its computation is non-trivial,
this equilibrium concept is the key to our analysis. It delivers a non-degenerate cross-sectional
distribution of ﬁrms, µ, which provides us with an artiﬁcial dataset of ﬁrms of diﬀerent size,
productivities, and more importantly, diversiﬁcation strategies. With this information at
hand we are ready to address the key empirical ﬁndings in this area.
9

This problem is equivalent to that of a shareholder investing in the stocks of each ﬁrm (Gomes (2001)).
Note that π(s , k, z; W ) = π(s(s, k, z), k, z; W ) = π(s, k, z; W ). Similarly, for l(s, k, z; W ) = l(s , k, z; W ).
11
The proof follows the arguments provided in Hopenhayn (1992) and Gomes (2001).
10
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3

Quantitative Results

Computing the stationary equilibrium involves two steps. First, we must specify parameter
values. These must be selected to be consistent with either long run properties of the data
(unconditional ﬁrst moments) or with prior empirical evidence. Second, we develop and
implement a numerical algorithm capable of approximating the stationary equilibrium up
to an arbitrarily small error. Appendix B describes this procedure in detail. With the
equilibrium computed, we focus on two key empirical issues. Section 3.2 investigates the
model’s implications for the so-called “diversiﬁcation discount”, by comparing our predictions
with the results in Lang and Stulz (1994). Since our model implies that diversiﬁcation is
driven by productivity diﬀerentials, it is important to investigate its predictions for the
relation between ﬁrm diversiﬁcation and productivity. Section 3.3 explores this issue by
comparing our results with the empirical evidence in Schoar (2002).

3.1

Calibration and Summary Statistics

Since most data is available at an annual frequency, we assume that a time period in the
model corresponds to one year. The calibration exercise is divided in two parts. First, we
use independent evidence on the degree of returns to scale (Burnside’s (1996)) to set the
output elasticities αl = 0.65 and αk = 0.3. The rate of depreciation in the capital stock is
set to 0.1, a value close to that found in the data by Gomes (2001).
The four remaining parameters, f, λ, σ, and ρ, cannot be individually identiﬁed from
the available data. Instead, they are chosen so that the model is able to approximate the
unconditional moments on the panel studied by Lang and Stulz (1994) for Compustat. Since
the main stylized facts are, in eﬀect, conditional moments, or regressions, from this panel, this
seems appropriate. Accordingly, we select these parameters so that the model approximates
the cross-sectional mean and dispersion of Tobin’s Q, the fraction of diversiﬁed ﬁrms in the
sample, and the average level of Q for conglomerates.12

12

The preference parameters are not important and we simply use β = 1/1.065 and A = W = 0.5.
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Table 1: : Parameter Choices
This table reports our parameter choices. The time period is one year. Output elasticities, αk and αl are
set using evidence from Burnside (1996). The rate of depreciation for the capital stock, δ, is set close to the
value found by Gomes (2001). The four remaining parameters, f , λ, σ, and ρ are chosen so that the model
approximates four unconditional moments from the COMPUSTAT panel studied by Lang and Stulz (1994).
The moments are the mean and standard deviation of Tobin’s Q, the number (percentage) of diversiﬁed
ﬁrms in the sample and the average level of Tobin’s Q for conglomerates.

Parameter
Technology
αk
αl
δ
f
λ
Shocks
σ
ρ

Benchmark Value
0.3
0.65
0.1
0.002
0.6
0.025
0.95

Table 2: : Summary Statistic
This Table compares the summary statistics generated by the stationary equilibrium of the model, given the
parameter choices in Table 1, with those of the COMPUSTAT panel studied by Lang and Stulz (1994) and
reported in Table 1 of their paper.
Statistics
Fraction Focused Firms
Tobin’s Q
Average
Standard Deviation
Average (Conglomerates)
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Data
0.40

Model
0.33

1.11
1.22
0.91

1.87
1.11
1.56

Table 1 summarizes our calibration procedure while Table 2 compares the key summary
statistics generated by the stationary equilibrium of the model with those of the Compustat
dataset used by Lang and Stulz (1994). Although our model calibration does not reproduce
these four statistics exactly, the artiﬁcial sample is reasonably similar to its empirical
counterpart, particularly in terms of cross-sectional dispersion and the relative weight of
conglomerates in the sample, the two crucial elements for statistical inference.

3.2

Diversification Discount

Most empirical studies on the eﬃciency of conglomerates examine the relation between
diversiﬁcation and ﬁrm value, as measure by Tobin’s (average) Q. Speciﬁcally, this is often
done by estimating linear reduced form equations:
Qit = b0 + b1 DIVit + b2 ln(kit ) + ξ it ,

(14)

where Qit is the value of Tobin’s Q for ﬁrm i at the beginning of period t, kit is the beginning
of period size of the ﬁrm, and DIVit is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if ﬁrm is
diversiﬁed in period t and zero otherwise.
In the context of our model, it is straightforward to estimate equation (14) for our artiﬁcial
panel of ﬁrms by deﬁning the variables:
Q=
and

p(s , k, z)
,
k


DIV =

1, if s = 3
,
0, else

where p(s , k, z) denotes the value of the ﬁrm of size k that chooses to operate in sector s in
period t.
Table 3 compares the results of estimating (14) in our model with the empirical ﬁndings
in Lang and Stulz (1994). In all cases we report the means across 100 simulations, for both
the coeﬃcients and the corresponding t-statistics. As in Lang and Stulz (1994), Table 3
reports results for both the full panel and a subset that includes only those ﬁrms with a
value of Q below 5.13
13

When possible we focus on the numbers reported by Lang and Stulz (1994) for “industry-adjusted” Q s,
since these control for the fact that diversiﬁed ﬁrms are generally concentrated in low Q industries.
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Table 3: : The Diversification Discount
This Table reports the results of estimating the following regression:
Qit = b0 + b1 DIVit + b2 ln(kit ) + ξ it ,
on our artiﬁcial panel of ﬁrms. Here Qit is the value of Tobin’s Q for ﬁrm i at the beginning of period
t, kit is the beginning of period size of the ﬁrm, and DIVit is a dummy variable that takes value one if
ﬁrm is diversiﬁed in period t and zero otherwise. The results of this estimation are then compared with
the empirical ﬁndings from Table 6 in Lang and Stulz (1994). In all cases we report the means across 100
simulations, for both the coeﬃcients and the corresponding t-statistics. The Table also reports our ﬁndings
for the subset of ﬁrms for which the value of Q is below 5, and compares those with the results in Lang and
Stulz (1994).

Variable
DIV
(t-stat)
log(k)
(t-stat)

All Firms
Data
Model
−0.34
−0.20
(−3.77)
(−5.39)

Q<5
Data
Model
−0.29
−0.07
(−4.53)
(−3.71)

−0.12
(−3.48)

−0.13
(−5.22)

−0.70
(−5.26)
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−0.31
(−5.29)

Overall the model performs very well. As in the data, we consistently ﬁnd that diversiﬁed
ﬁrms are discounted, that this discount is statistically signiﬁcant, and that this is only
partially accounted for by diﬀerences in ﬁrm size (the coeﬃcient on ln(k)). Moreover, the
model also predicts a diversiﬁcation discount that is quantitatively similar to that found in
the real data.
Looking only at the subset of ﬁrms with a value of Q below 5 shows that the observed
diversiﬁcation discount is not due to a small number of outliers. Table 3 conﬁrms that in
the model, as in the data, eliminating outliers does decrease the discount’s magnitude but
it does not eliminate it. Although smaller, the coeﬃcient on the diversiﬁcation dummy is
signiﬁcant, both statistically and economically.
Thus, despite the fact that conglomerates operate eﬃciently and that diversiﬁcation
clearly adds value to the ﬁrm, our model is able to rationalize the documented diversiﬁcation
“discount”. Moreover, this discount also seems to possess the same robustness properties
that are observed in the actual data. Since diversiﬁcation is optimal however, the explanation
cannot be that conglomerates destroy value. Instead, the success of the model hinges on the
endogenous selection mechanism identiﬁed in section 2.1.4.
It is important to note that our results accord with the view that conglomerates are
indeed less eﬃcient ﬁrms. Crucially however, they are not ineﬃcient. In particular, and as
long as λ > 0, separation of their units destroys shareholder value.
Finally, the exact magnitude of the discount depends on synergies created by the
conglomerate, measured by the parameter λ. Indeed, if these synergies are too large, the
discount may disappear altogether. We view this dependence as an important strength of
the model and a useful direction for future research. For instance, allowing λ to vary across
ﬁrms could rationalize recent evidence suggesting that the magnitude of the discount seems
to vary with the level of synergies created by diversiﬁcation (for example Chevalier (2001)).
3.2.1

Source of the Diversification Discount

Following Lang and Stulz (1994), Tables 4 and 5 attempt to shed light on the source of the
discount. We focus on two subsamples of the full panel of ﬁrms: on-going conglomerates
and newly diversiﬁed ﬁrms. Table 4 reports the results of estimating (14) for the subsample
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of ﬁrms that do not change the number of segments in which they operate. Speciﬁcally,
we consider only the set of ﬁrms for which st = st−1 = ... = st−4 , thus excluding all newly
diversiﬁed (as well as refocused) ﬁrms from the sample. As Table 4 documents, however,
excluding these newly diversiﬁed ﬁrms does not eliminate the observed discount both in the
data and in the model. Moreover, the actual value of the discount in our model is again very
close to that observed by Lang and Stulz (1994).
By contrast, Table 5 looks at the behavior of ﬁrms that change the numbers of segments
of activity across adjacent years. Speciﬁcally, these ﬁrms are classiﬁed as “diversifying”, if
they change the number of sectors they operate in from one to two (formally st−1 = 1 or 2
and st = 3) and “focusing” ﬁrms if they reduce the number of activities from 2 to 1 (st−1 = 3
and st = 1 or 2). These ﬁrms are then compared with those that maintained the number of
activities constant during the same period. For “diversifying” ﬁrms, the comparison group is
the set of other previously focused ﬁrms that chose not to become diversiﬁed in the current
period. Similarly, focusing ﬁrms are compared with other diversiﬁed ﬁrms that chose to
remain diversiﬁed.
Following Lang and Stulz (1994) we report two alternative results. First, we look at the
average diﬀerences in Q at the time that the ﬁrms choose to expand (or contract). Next, we
also look at the dynamic eﬀects of the decision, by comparing the eﬀects of diversiﬁcation
(refocusing) on ∆Q.
The ﬁndings are somewhat inconclusive, both in the model and in the data. Whether
we look at levels or changes in Q, no coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant. Although there
is some suggestion, again both in the model and the data, that diversifying ﬁrms seem to
experience drops in Q (while the opposite happens for focusing ﬁrms) the evidence is just
not strong enough. The model’s implications for the level of Q are somewhat less successful,
but again not statistically signiﬁcant.14
Overall, Tables 4 and 5 broadly conﬁrm the empirical success of our model. It is not only
capable of generating a diversiﬁcation discount, but also provides quantitatively realistic
results for the subsets of existing and newly diversiﬁed ﬁrms.
14

Intuitively, the lack of statistical signiﬁcance in the artiﬁcial sample is a consequence of the small variation
in the shocks z. Although large variations would change this quantitative ﬁnding, a larger dispersion in z
would lead to an unrealistically high dispersion in Q.
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Table 4: : Firms With Constant Segments
This Table reports the results estimating the regression:
Qit = b0 + b1 DIVit + b2 ln(kit ) + ξ it ,
on our artiﬁcial panel of ﬁrms. Here Qit is the value of Tobin’s Q for ﬁrm i at the beginning of period t,
kit is the beginning of period size of the ﬁrm, and DIVit is a dummy variable that takes value one if ﬁrm is
diversiﬁed in period t and zero otherwise. The regression is performed only on the sub-sample of ﬁrms that
do not change the number of segments in which they operate for a number of years. Speciﬁcally, we consider
only ﬁrms for which st = st−1 = ... = st−4 . In all cases we report the means across 100 simulations, for both
the coeﬃcients and the corresponding t-statistics. The results of this estimation are then compared with the
empirical ﬁndings from Table 8 in Lang and Stulz (1994).

Variable
DIV
(t-stat)

Data
−0.20
(−2.05)

Model
−0.17
(−3.14)

ln(k)
(t-stat)

−0.03
(−0.64)

−0.66
(−3.48)
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Table 5: : Firms Changing Segments
This Table compares ﬁrms that change the numbers of segments of activity across adjacent years with those
ﬁrms that maintain the number of activities constant. Speciﬁcally, ﬁrms are classiﬁed as “diversifying” if
they change the number of sectors they operate from one to two (formally st−1 = 1 or 2 and st = 3). We
provide two separate results. First, we look at the average diﬀerences in Q at the time of the diversiﬁcation
takes place by estimating the regression:
Qit = b0 + b1 DIVit + ξ it ,
for the subset of previously focused ﬁrms (st−1 < 3). Here Qit is the value of Tobin’s Q for ﬁrm i at the
beginning of period t, and DIVit is a dummy variable that takes value one if ﬁrm has been focused at t−1 and
becomes diversiﬁed in period t and zero otherwise. Next, we look at the dynamic eﬀects of diversiﬁcation, by
comparing the eﬀects of diversiﬁcation on ∆Q.˙We accomplish that by estimating the following regression:
∆Qit = b0 + b1 DIVit + ξ it ,
again only for the subset of previously focused ﬁrms. Here ∆Qit = Qit − Qit−1 . This Table also reports the
eﬀects of refocusing on ﬁrm value, by estimating the same regressions as above, and letting DIVit equal one
if ﬁrm has been diversiﬁed at t − 1 and becomes focused in period t and zero otherwise. These regressions
are only estimated for the subset of previously diversiﬁed ﬁrms. In all cases we report the means across 100
simulations, for both the coeﬃcients and the corresponding t-statistics. The results of this estimation are
then compared with the empirical ﬁndings from Table 8 in Lang and Stulz (1994).

Variable

Regression on Qt
Data
Model

DIV
(t-stat)

−0.163
(−1.23)

DIV
(t-stat)

−0.016
(−0.70)

Regression on ∆Qt = Qt+1 − Qt
Data
Model

Diversifying Firms
0.045
−0.204
(0.37)
(−1.60)
Focusing Firms
0.035
(1.40)
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0.024
(1.39)

−0.038
(−1.46)

0.020
(1.22)

3.2.2

Robustness

While our benchmark calibration appears quite successful it is interesting to examine the
robustness of our ﬁndings to alternative choices of parameter values, particularly in light of
the fact that there is relatively little a-priori evidence for the four parameters, f ,λ,σ, and ρ.
Table 3 investigates whether our main ﬁndings, regarding the existence of a diversiﬁcation
discount, are sensitive to our choices for these parameters. Speciﬁcally, Table 6 compares the
results of ﬁtting the regression equation (14) to artiﬁcial samples, generated by varying our
choices for the key parameters f ,λ,σ, and ρ. While the exact magnitude of the discount varies
across the diﬀerent experiments, the basic qualitative ﬁnding of a diversiﬁcation discount
seems robust. The alternative values are chosen to indicate which changes lead to lower
discounts. Thus, low variability in productivity (low σ or ρ) reduces the cross-sectional
variability in Q and thus the discount. High ﬁxed costs, f , increase the cost savings of
conglomerates, λf , and lower the discount. Decreasing the cost savings λ also lowers the
implied discount. The reason is that lower synergies make diversiﬁcation less attractive.
With a low λ most conglomerates are formed to take advantage of decreasing returns to
scale, and this eﬀect is entirely captured by the large coeﬃcient of ln k.

3.3

Diversification and Productivity

In our model productivity diﬀerentials play a key role in determining ﬁrm behavior and
the observed link between diversiﬁcation and ﬁrm valuation. In this section, we investigate
whether the implied movements in ﬁrm and sectoral productivity are also consistent with
existing empirical evidence.

In a recent study, Schoar (2002) carefully documents the

productivity patterns in manufacturing using the LRD database. Speciﬁcally, she computes
Total Factor Productivity (TFP) for each plant, j, in each ﬁrm, i, and every period, t, by
estimating the residual, εijt , in the following log-linear Cobb-Douglas production function:
ln(yijt ) = ajt + bjt ln (kijt ) + cjt ln (lijt ) + εijt ,
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(15)

Table 6: : Robustness of the Diversification Discount
This Table examines the robustness of our ﬁndings by reporting the results of estimating the following
regression:
Qit = b0 + b1 DIVit + b2 ln(kit ) + ξ it ,
on several artiﬁcial panels of ﬁrms, obtained by varying the choice values for key parameters of the model.
Here Qit is the value of Tobin’s Q for ﬁrm i at the beginning of period t, kit is the beginning of period
size of the ﬁrm, and DIVit is a dummy variable that takes value one if ﬁrm is diversiﬁed in period t and
zero otherwise. In all cases we report the means across 100 simulations, for both the coeﬃcients and the
corresponding t-statistics.

Variable

Baseline

f = 0.004

λ = 0.5

σ = 0.02

ρ = 0.75

DIV
(t-stat)

−0.20
(−5.39)

−0.03
(−1.81)

−0.12
(−3.55)

−0.07
(−5.98)

−0.05
(−7.02)

log(k)
(t-stat)

−0.70
(−5.26)

−0.23
(−26.95)

−0.70
(−14.9)

−0.21
(−41.13)

−0.27
(−9.51)
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Given this measure of productivity, we can examine the relation between ﬁrm
diversiﬁcation and ﬁrm productivity. Schoar (2002) focuses on two measures. First, she
seeks to capture static diﬀerences in average productivity across ﬁrms by estimating the
following equation:
T F Pijt = a1 + b1 × SEGit + µijt .

(16)

where SEGit is the logarithm of the number of segments in which ﬁrm i operates in period
t. Thus, estimating b1 > 0 implies that diversiﬁed (multi-segment) ﬁrms are, on average,
more productive than focused ﬁrms. In addition, she also examines the dynamic eﬀects of
diversiﬁcation on future productivity. This is accomplished by estimating the equation:
T F Pijt = a2 + b2 × AF T ERit + ν ijt .

(17)

where AF T ERit is deﬁned as a dummy variable that equals one in the period after the
ﬁrm diversiﬁes and it is equal to zero otherwise.15 Thus, a ﬁnding of b2 > 0 implies that
diversiﬁcation improves plant productivity.
It is again relatively straightforward to use the artiﬁcial panel of ﬁrms generated by our
model to replicate Schoar’s (2002) procedures and compare the results. Given our measures
of capital, labor and output and assuming that each activity corresponds to one plant we
can easily estimate (15-17). Table 7 compares our ﬁndings with the results in Tables II and
IV from Schoar (2002).
While Schoar (2002) ﬁnds a signiﬁcant productivity premium of more than 3% for
diversiﬁed ﬁrms, our model implies that focused ﬁrms are, on average, 2.3% more productive.
However, this result depends on the magnitude of the diversiﬁcation discount, since lower
productivity leads to lower valuations. This is important since in Schoar’s LRD sample the
average market discount for diversiﬁed ﬁrms is only about 10%, while our model, which
is calibrated to replicate the Lang and Stulz’s (1994) results, implies a discount of about
20%. The last column of Table 7 addresses this issue by recalibrating our model to generate a
discount of exactly 10%, thus making our results directly comparable with hers. We ﬁnd that
in this case our model can also match the observed productivity premium for conglomerates.
15

Schoar (2002) also adds variables such as age and the number of segments the ﬁrm operates. In the
context of our model, however, age is not deﬁned and the number of segments is redundant.
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Table 7: : Diversification and Productivity
This Table compares of our ﬁndings with the results in Tables II and IV from Schoar (2002). First, we
capture static diﬀerences in average productivity across ﬁrms by estimating the equation:
T F Pijt = a1 + b1 × SEGit + µijt .
where T F Pij and SEGit denote, respectively, total factor productivity in segment j and the logarithm of
the number of segments in which ﬁrm i operates in period t. Second, the dynamic eﬀects of diversiﬁcation
on future productivity are summarized with the regression:
T F Pijt = a2 + b2 × AF T ERit + ν ijt .
where AF T ERit deﬁned as a dummy variable that equals one in the period after the ﬁrm diversiﬁes and it
is equal to zero otherwise. Results are reported for the benchmark case and an alternative calibration that
matches Schoar’s ﬁnding of 10% discount. In both cases we report the means across 100 simulations, for
both the coeﬃcients and the corresponding t-statistics.

Variable

Data

SEG
(t-stat)

0.034
(2.13)

Baseline
−0.023
(−22.38)

AF T ER
(t-stat)

−0.026
(−6.50)

−0.013
(−7.81)
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Model
10% Discount
0.009
(18.58)
−0.008
(−2.27)

Table 7 also shows that our model successfully reproduces the observed losses of
productivity after the ﬁrm diversiﬁes.16 As Schoar (2002) argues, these ﬁndings reinforce the
importance of distinguishing between the static eﬀect of being diversiﬁed and the dynamic
eﬀect of becoming diversiﬁed. From a static, or cross-sectional, point-of-view, diversiﬁed
ﬁrms are, on average, more productive than focused ﬁrms. However, as Figure 1 illustrates,
diversiﬁcation in our model is often the result of bad productivity shocks in on-going
activities. Thus, it is not surprising to ﬁnd that, on average, diversiﬁcation is associated
with productivity losses in incumbent sectors, just as Schoar (2002) ﬁnds.17
These results suggest that our basic argument that diversiﬁcation decisions are driven
by eﬃcient responses to productivity diﬀerentials is not the result of assuming unrealistic
patterns for productivity. The fact that our model is consistent with much of the evidence
also suggests a possible alternative interpretation to the more popular “new toy eﬀect”,
that emphasizes a shift in focus by managers towards the newly acquired segments at the
expense of incumbent ones. Our ﬁndings show that this evidence can also be rationalized in
the context of a value maximizing model.

4

Conclusions

In this paper we show that a general dynamic model of optimal behavior of a ﬁrm that
maximizes shareholder value is actually consistent with the main empirical ﬁndings about
ﬁrm diversiﬁcation and performance. Here, diversiﬁcation is a natural result of ﬁrm growth
and it stems from dynamic ﬁrm strategies that maximize value. Diversiﬁcation allows a ﬁrm
to explore new productive opportunities, while taking advantage of economies of scale and
reducing the volatility of its cash ﬂows.
The dynamic structure of our model allows us to examine several aspects of the
relationship between ﬁrm diversiﬁcation and performance in a very general setting. In
particular, we need not place any signiﬁcant restrictions on the nature of functional forms
or parameter values in our model, beyond those already discussed. The very forces leading
16

Here, our results can only be compared with Schoar’s (2002) estimates for incumbent plants since, in
our model, new plants have no prior history.
17
Firms may also diversify if the diversiﬁcation threshold moves because outside opportunities improve.
In this case productivity in the incumbent sector need not fall for these ﬁrms.
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to optimal diversiﬁcation, are suﬃcient to generate a wealth of realistic features, regarding
ﬁrm diversiﬁcation, size, productivity and valuations.
We obtain several important results. First, we can show that ﬁrms currently expanding
are not only less productive than other (non-expanding) focused ﬁrms, but they also
experience productivity losses after the expansion, as documented by Schoar (2002). Second,
as Santalo (2001), we ﬁnd that size diﬀerences can account for part of the diﬀerences both
in productivity and valuation across focused and diversifying ﬁrms. However, we also show
that this size “eﬀect”, can not account for all of these diﬀerences. Finally, and perhaps more
surprisingly, we show that despite all the obvious advantages to ﬁrm diversiﬁcation and the
fact that ﬁrm diversiﬁcation does not destroy value in our model, it is still possible to obtain
a diversiﬁcation discount as documented by Lang and Stulz (1994).
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A

Proofs

We derive all formal proofs under the most general set of conditions. Accordingly, deﬁne the
2
be the space of inputs and suppose that the stochastic
set S = {1, 2, 3}. Let K × L ⊆ R+

process for the shock has a bounded support Z = [z, z]×[z, z], −∞ < z < z < ∞. Moreover,
deﬁne

z

and

k

as the minimal sigma-ﬁelds generated by Z and K, respectively. Finally

let F (k, l) denote a general decreasing returns to scale technology and Q(zt+1 |zt ) be the
transition function of z.
We make the following minimal assumptions regarding the nature of these functions and
the size of the ﬁxed costs.
Assumption 1 The production function F (•): (i) is continuously diﬀerentiable; (ii) is
strictly increasing; (iii) is strictly concave; (iv) satisﬁes the standard Inada conditions; and
(v) exhibits decreasing returns to scale in k and l.
Assumption 2 The technology levels zt = (zt1 , zt2 ) follow a joint Markov transition function
Q(zt+1 , zt ) : Z ×

z

→ [0, 1] × [0, 1] that: (i) is stationary, (ii) is monotone and (iii) satisﬁes

the Feller property. Let G(z) denote the invariant distribution of z.
Assumption 3 The ﬁxed costs of production, f, are not too large, i.e. ∃k ∈ R+ : f ≤
zF (k, l).
To show existence and uniqueness deﬁne the operator






 

π(s , k, z) + (1 − δ)k − k + β v(s , k , z )Q(dz , z) , (A1)
(T v)(s, k, z) = max
{k ,s }

{s, 3}, s = 1, 2

s ∈
.
S, s = 3

Proof of Proposition 1.

Let C(S × K × Z) be the space of all bounded and continuous functions in S × K × Z.
The proof is in two steps:
(a) T : C(S × K × Z) −→ C(S × K × Z) (Lemma 1);
(b) T is a contraction in C(S × K × Z) (Lemma 2).
The Contraction Mapping Theorem then guarantees that there is a unique ﬁxed point
that satisﬁes (A1).
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Monotonicity then follows immediately from Theorems 9.7 and 9.11 in Stokey and Lucas
(1989).
Lemma 1 T : C(S × K × Z) −→ C(S × K × Z) .
Proof. Suppose v(s , k  , z  ) ∈ C(S × K × Z). Since Q(dz  |z) has the Feller property it
follows from Lemma 9.5 in Stokey and Lucas (89) that

v(s , k  , z  )Q(dz  , z) ∈ C(S × K × Z).
Since π(s , k, z) is also bounded and continuous, the result follows immediately.
Lemma 2 T is a contraction in C(S × K × Z).
Proof. The proof uses Blackwell’s suﬃcient conditions for a contraction.
(a)Monotonicity.
Consider v1 (s, k, z), v2 (s, k, z) ∈ C(S × K × Z), such that v1 (s, k, z) ≥ v2 (s, k, z). It
follows that













v1 (s , k , z )Q(dz , z) ≥

v2 (s , k  , z  )Q(dz  , z),

and hence
(T v1 )(s, k, z) ≥ (T v2 )(s, k, z).
(b) Discounting
Let a ∈ R and v(s, k, z) ∈ C(S × K × Z). It follows that
(T v + a)(s, k, z) = v(s, k, z) + βa = (T v)(s, k, z) + βa.

Proof of Proposition 2 Using (8) we can rewrite the optimal diversiﬁcation decision of
a focused ﬁrm as
Π(s, k, z) + Ψ(s, z) ≥ (1 − λ)f,

s ∈ {1, 2}

(A2)

Π(s, k, z) ≡ π(3, k, z) − π(s, k, z) + (1 − λ)f,

(A3)

where
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and
 

 


Ψ(s, z) = Ψ(s , z) |s =s ≡ max
β v(3, k , z )Q(dz , z) − k −
k
 

 


β v(s, k , z )Q(dz , z) − k .
−max



k

(A4)

Equation (A2) decomposes the optimal diversiﬁcation decision into a “proﬁt” component,
Π(s, k, z), and an “option” component, Ψ(s, z), associated with the continuation payoﬀs. By
deﬁnition k̂(s, z), satisﬁes
Π(s, k̂(s, z), z) + Ψ(s, z) = (1 − λ)f,

∀(s, z) ∈ S × Z

(A5)

Lemmas 3 and 4 imply that the left hand side is non-negative and strictly increasing in k.
Hence, if diversiﬁcation is optimal for k = k̂(s, z), it must also be optimal for k > k̂(s, z). If
the left hand side exceeds (1 − λ)f then diversiﬁcation is always optimal and k̂(s, z) = 0.
To establish monotonicity let z = (z s , z s) and z = (z s + ∆z s , z s), with ∆z s > 0. It follows
from (A5) that
Π(s, k̂(s, z), z) + Ψ(s, z) = (1 − λ)f.
Lemmas 3 and 4 imply that both Π(·) and Ψ(·) are decreasing in z s . Since Π(·) is increasing
in k, it follows that k̂(s, z) > k̂(s, z).
Analogously, let z = (z s , z s+∆z s), with ∆z s > 0. Since both Π(·) and Ψ(·) are increasing
in z s (Lemmas 3 and 4), it follows that k̂(s, z) < k̂(s, z).
Now consider a previously diversiﬁed ﬁrm. Here the threshold is determined by

p(3, k̂(s, z), z) ≥ max p(1, k̂(s, z), z), p(2, k̂(s, z), z)

(A6)

or, simply, by

min

s∈{1,2}

Π(s, k̂(s, z), z) + Ψ(s, z) = (1 − λ)f,

∀z ∈ Z

(A7)

Again the left hand side is non-negative and strictly increasing in k, since Π(s, k, z) + Ψ(s, z)
has these properties as well, and the result follows as above.
Lemma 3 Let Π(s, k, z) be deﬁned by (A3). Then Π(s, k, z) is (i) non-negative; (ii) weakly
increasing in k; and (iii) decreasing in z s and increasing in z s, s = s.
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Proof. (i) Π(s, k, z) ≥ 0. By deﬁnition
π(3, k, z) = π(1, θ∗ k, z) + π(2, (1 − θ∗ )k, z) + λf
where θ∗ = θ(k, z), is the optimal share of capital allocated to sector 1. Clearly then

π(1, k, z) − (1 − λ)f, θ∗ = 1
π(3, k, z) ≡
π(2, k, z) − (1 − λ)f, θ∗ = 0
since θ∗ is chosen optimally, it follows that
Π(s, k, z) = π(3, k, z) − π(s, k, z) ≥ 0
(ii) Monotonicity in k. Taking derivatives of π(3, k, z) with respect to k we obtain
∂π(3, k, z)
∂π(1, θ∗ k, z)
=
∂k
∂(θk)

k

∂θ∗
+ θ∗
∂k

+

∂π(2, (1 − θ∗ )k, z)
∂(θk)

−k

∂θ∗
+ (1 − θ∗ )
∂k

Noting that the optimal choice of θ∗ implies
∂π(1, θ∗ k, z)
∂π(2, (1 − θ∗ )k, z)
=
,
∂(θk)
∂(θk)
we immediately obtain
∂π(3, k, z)
∂π(s , θ∗ k, z)
∂π(s, k, z)
=
≥
,
∂k
∂(θk)
∂k

s = 1, 2.

Where the inequality follows from the fact that the proﬁt function is strictly concave and
θ ≤ 1. Since
∂Π(s, k, z)
∂π(3, k, z) ∂π(s, k, z)
=
−
≥ 0,
∂k
∂k
∂k

s = 1, 2

(iii) Monotonicity in z. Taking derivatives of π(3, k, z) with respect to z s and simplifying as
in (ii) we obtain
∂π(3, k, z)
∂π(s, θ∗ k, z) ∂π(
s, (1 − θ∗ )k, z)
∂π(s, θ∗ k, z)
=
+
=
∂z s
∂z s
∂z s
∂z s
since production in sector s does not depend on the shock to sector i. Now, using the
envelope theorem and the proﬁts deﬁnitions (6) and (5) yields
∂π(3, k, z)
∂π(s, k, z)
= F (θ∗ k s , ·) ≤ F (k s , ·) =
.
s
∂z
∂z s
and hence that
∂Π(s, k, z)
≤ 0, s = 1, 2.
∂z s
Monotonicity in z s follows immediately from the fact that π(s, k, z) depends only on z s .
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Lemma 4 Let Ψ(s, z) be deﬁned by (A4). Then Ψ(s, z) is: (i) non-negative; and (ii)
decreasing in z s and increasing in z s, s = s.
Proof. (i) Ψ(s, z) ≥ 0. First note that
v(3, k  , z  ) = max {p(1, k  , z  ), p(2, k  , z  ), p(3, k  , z  )}
≥ max {p(s , k  , z  ), p(3, k  , z  )} = v(s , k  , z  ),
∀(k  , z  ) ∈ K × Z, ∀s ∈ {1, 2},
From monotonicity of Q(·) it follows that

max {p(1, k  , z  ), p(2, k  , z  ), p(3, k  , z  )} Q(dz  , z)

≥
max {p(s , k  , z  ), p(3, k  , z  )} Q(dz  , z),
Hence for any value of z ∈ Z and any value of k  ∈ K


 


β v(3, k , z )Q(dz , z) − k ≥ β v(s , k  , z  )Q(dz  , z) − k  .
Since this holds for every value of k  it follows that it holds at the maximum and Ψ(s, z) ≥ 0.
(ii) Ψ(s, z) is decreasing in z s and increasing in z s, s = s. Suppose z s >> z s. Then
p(s, k, z) >> p(
s, k, z),
and consequently
v(3, k, z) ≈ max {p(s, k, z), p(3, k, z)} .
Given the monotonicity of Q(·) it follows that:



 

 
 

v(3, k , z )Q(dz , z) ≈ max {p(s, k , z ), p(3, k , z )} Q(dz , z) = v(s, k  , z  )Q(dz  , z),
and, therefore, Ψ(s, z) = 0.
Now suppose that the opposite is true, i.e. z s << z s. In that case
v(3, k, z) ≈ max {p(
s, k, z), p(3, k, z)}
and








v(3, k , z )Q(dz , z) ≈













max {p(
s, k , z ), p(3, k , z )} Q(dz , z) >



v(s, k  , z  )Q(dz  , z).

which implies that Ψ(s, z) > 0. It follows from continuity of both v(·) and Q(·) that Ψ(s, z)
must fall with z s .
An identical argument can be constructed to establish that Ψ(s, z) increases with z s.
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Proof of Corollary 3 In the absence of ﬁxed costs inequality (A2) is always satisﬁed.
Proof of Corollary 4 Inequality (A2) is always satisﬁed if λ ≥ 1.

B

Solution Method

The computational strategy involves the following steps
1. Solving the Bellman Equation (7) and computing the optimal ﬁrm decision rules;
2. Using the optimal decision rules to iterate on (10) and compute the stationary measure
µ = µ = µ∗
3. Computing aggregate quantities and using the market clearing condition (12) to
determine the equilibrium levels of consumption and labor.
Given the properties of our problem, the ﬁrst step is better implemented with the less
eﬃcient but more robust method of value function iteration on a discrete state space.
We specify a grid with a ﬁnite number of points for the capital stock as well as a ﬁnite
approximation to the normal random vector z. The later task is accomplished using in
Tauchen and Hussey’s (1991) method for optimal discrete state space approximations to
normal random variables. We use 15 × 15 grid points for this procedure. The space for
the capital stock is divided in 201 equally spaced elements. In either case the results were
relatively unchanged when we use ﬁner grids. The upper bound for capacity, k, was chosen
to be non-binding at all times.
To compute µ∗ , we take the optimal value function v(s, k, z) and the decision rules
k(s, k, z) and s(s, k, z), as well as the stochastic process for the technology shocks z and
proceed as follows:
• Deﬁne the size of the panel data, by specifying the number of ﬁrms M and the length
of time T.
• Simulate a sequence of exogenous technology shocks zit = (zit1 , zit2 ) for each ﬁrm i in
every period t.
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• For the initial period
(i) Initiate each ﬁrm’s capital stock at k = k0 .
(ii) Start the simulation by using draws from a uniform distribution to randomly
allocating ﬁrms to either sector 1 or 2.
• For all other periods
(i) Given the current state for each ﬁrm i, (sit−1 , kit , zit ) use the optimal policy functions
to determine next period’s capital stock, kit+1 , and sectoral decision, sit .
(ii) Using the value function, compute the current market value of the ﬁrm i, vit .
(iii) Using the stochastic process for z, compute next period’s shock zit+1 .
(v) Construct the cross-sectional distribution of ﬁrms µit = µ(sit , kit , zit ).
• Continue the simulation until µit − µit+1 < ε.
Using the stationary distribution, µ, it is straightforward to use the goods market
condition to obtain aggregate consumption.
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